There is a clear line between political expression and institutionalized intimidation. At McGill and Concordia, that line is being crossed, and university leadership is pretending not to see it.
In recent years, student groups and campus bodies have advanced BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) motions targeting Israel. On paper, these are presented as legitimate political positions. In practice, they often function quite differently: as organized campaigns that single out Jewish students, isolate them academically and socially, and legitimize a climate of hostility within institutions that are legally obliged to protect them. The BDS motion adopted this week by Law Students 4 Palestine McGill at McGill’s Faculty of Law is the latest example.
Let us be clear. Canada does not prohibit boycotts. Supporting or opposing BDS is, in itself, lawful expression. But universities are not mere bystanders. They are institutions subject to clear legal obligations, and those obligations do not disappear simply because the speech in question is framed as political.
Under the Civil Code of Quebec, particularly Articles 1457 and 1458, universities owe a duty of prudence and diligence. They must take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm. When they fail to act in the face of known risks, their civil liability may be engaged. Quebec courts have confirmed this repeatedly. In Dubé v. Université de Sherbrooke, the Superior Court assessed university liability through the lens of civil fault, emphasizing the obligation to act reasonably to prevent foreseeable harm. In Lemieux v. Université du Québec à Montréal, the court confirmed that universities must respect and enforce their own internal rules. And in Université de Montréal v. Syndicat des chargées et chargés de cours, the Court of Appeal made clear that universities, despite their autonomy, remain subject to legal standards of reasonableness and accountability.
These principles are not unique to Quebec. They reflect a well-established Canadian legal consensus. The Supreme Court of Canada has long held that institutions exercising authority over individuals must take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm. In Myers v. Peel County Board of Education, it affirmed that institutions responsible for students owe duties of supervision and protection. In Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd., it confirmed that where risk is foreseeable, an organization may have a positive duty to intervene. And in Prud’homme v. Prud’homme, it held that civil liability arises where a person fails to meet the standard of reasonable conduct expected in the circumstances.
The jurisprudence is equally clear regarding internal rules. In Young v. Bella, the Supreme Court recognized institutional liability for negligent handling of matters affecting students. In Pridgen v. University of Calgary, the Alberta Court of Appeal explicitly recognized the contractual nature of the university-student relationship, holding that universities are bound by their own policies and disciplinary frameworks.
The law is therefore clear: universities must act where harm is foreseeable, and they must enforce their own rules. When universities tolerate organized campaigns that isolate or intimidate identifiable groups of students, the resulting harm is not incidental—it is foreseeable. And in Quebec law, foreseeable harm engages responsibility.
It is entirely foreseeable that repeated, targeted motions against Israel—the only state in the world subjected to such singular treatment—will have repercussions for Jewish students, many of whom are publicly or implicitly associated with the Jewish state. When these campaigns are accompanied by rhetoric that shifts from criticism to demonization, this is no longer an abstract debate. It is a climate in which Jewish students are marginalized, harassed, and in some cases intimidated.
Universities know this. They have been warned repeatedly. Complaints have been filed. Incidents have been documented. Yet administrations retreat behind procedural justifications: academic freedom, student autonomy, freedom of debate.
But that is not what the law says. Quebec’s Act respecting academic freedom in the university sector protects the right to express opinions—but explicitly requires that this freedom be exercised with respect for the rights of others. Academic freedom is not a shield for intimidation, nor a license for institutional inaction.
The issue is not whether students may debate Israel. They can, and they must be able to. The issue is whether universities may allow their own structures—student associations, official platforms, institutional processes—to be used in ways that deliberately create a hostile environment for a protected group. The law answers clearly: no.
That is why legal actions are now underway. In Montreal, lawyer Neil Oberman has initiated proceedings against Concordia and, with the support of the Institute for Public Affairs, is preparing another against McGill, alleging that these institutions have failed in their obligation to protect Jewish students by refusing to enforce their own standards of conduct.
These recourses should never have been necessary. When courts must be asked to compel institutions to apply their own rules and uphold their most basic legal obligations, the problem is not the absence of law. It is the absence of leadership.
Universities must draw a clear line: criticism of any country, including Israel, is protected. But conduct—whether in the form of motions, demonstrations, or campaigns—that crosses into harassment, discrimination, or intimidation is not. And when that line is crossed, institutions must act. Not issue statements. Not strike committees. Act.
Because the mission of a university is not only to foster debate. It is also to ensure that all students can participate in that debate without fear. When Jewish students come to believe that their identity exposes them to exclusion, suspicion, or hostility, that mission is betrayed. And when universities knowingly allow such a climate to take hold, they are not defending academic freedom.
They are abandoning it.
